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Abstract: Microfinance is an economic policy complimentary to advancing 
female empowerment. Empowerment is particularly relevant in patriarchic 
Islamic contexts in the Middle East, however little research exists. Due to 
counterfactual creation and inconsistent empowerment measurement, the true 
impact is debated. This research proposes intra-spousal decision-making 
outcomes as the appropriate proxy to empowerment and uses a nuanced 
approach of counterfactual creation by utilizing responses from previous 
microfinance borrowers. Survey data from a Jordanian MFI is used to examine 
the endogeneity story and cash-in-hand effects on intra-spousal decision-
making outcomes. An instrumental variable estimation technique finds a weak 
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1.  Introduction  
 Developmental economic policy has many goals; two of which aim to alleviate poverty 
and empower women (Vonderlack-Navarro, 2010). The intersection of these two goals recently 
lie in providing micro loans to poor female entrepreneurs (Armend  riz and Morduch, 2005). 
The Middle East is one region to implement such a policy tool with limited region-specific 
research on the topic: a recent policy in line with the rise of the Islamic feminist movement, 
despite an unsettled debate of microfinance causing gender empowerment in other regions. Yet 
the understanding of causality is of importance if the purpose of  implementing microfinance is 
to positively influence Middle Eastern women (Johnson, 2005).   
 Through data collected from a Jordanian MFI, this research aims to examine if 
microfinance impacts married women's empowerment in Jordan. Second, this research proposes 
a nuanced method of constructing a counterfactual through the comparison of borrowers in 
different stages of the borrowing process. This study begins by building the framework for 
empowerment due to micro lending in an Islamic context then tests this understanding. 
Causality is estimated by using the interest rate of the first loan as an instrumental variable to 
find limited short term effects of microfinance in Jordan. This work can be built upon as an 
initial analysis of microfinance on empowerment in Jordan. 
 
2.  A Review of Literature 
 The literature over microfinance and empowerment is vast, to say the least. Pitt and 
Khandker's 1998 study sparked the topical debate over microfinance and women when the 
authors noted that the household is impacted more when institutions lend to women. In 2006, 
the authors pointed to microfinance's impact on empowerment, specifically, and cautioned 
further studies over the econometric problem of women's own selection into microfinance 
which may bias results (Pitt et al., 2006). Fifteen years later, academia still argues the causality 
of microfinance on empowerment due to self-selection.  
 While Pitt and Khandker find positive impacts on female empowerment, studies such as 
Goetz and Sen Gupta (1996), for example, find that men actually take control of their wives' 
loans so that women experience no change in empowerment. Similarly, Garikaparti (2008) find 
no empowerment effects due to patriarchal norms, however empowerment is defined in this 
study as the level of accounting knowledge. As argued by Osmani (2007), these differing results 
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are likely due to the researcher's identification of empowerment. If empowerment is defined by 
one dimension and is assumed to exist for a homogenous set of women little to no impact is 
generally found. However, if empowerment is defined through multiple dimensions, for a 
heterogeneous set of women, effects are more likely to be uncovered.  
 Though interpretation of an impact evaluation may be easier for a one-dimensional 
definition of empowerment, the true measure of empowerment can hardly be attributed to one 
type of woman in one aspect of power. As argued by many other authors, female efficacy is a 
multifaceted, dynamic and heterogeneous experience which is hard to define with external 
validity because it is hard to observe the same effects for all contexts (Johnson, 2005; Osmani, 
2007; Vonderlack-Navarro, 2010). Though empowerment is an intriguing notion, it is an 
abstract ideal needing context and concreteness (Doss, 2012). Therefore, to uncover impact 
measures a study must implement the correct definition, context and method first (Holvoet, 
2005; Hoveyda, 2007; Johnson, 2005). 
 Specific to Jordan, empowerment can be realized through the ideals held in the Islamic 
feminist movement (Alatiyat and Barari, 2010; Hoveyda, 2005; Madigan, 2009). Though 
feminism is rejected and accepted by many in Jordan, the more neutral Muslim woman argues 
empowerment as a choice for which only the individual and Allah will examine upon judgment 
day (Ahmed, 2008; Madigan, 2005; Hoveyda, 2005; Quawas, 2006; Sonbol, 2003). This 
definition of empowerment can be recognized as one's decision making ability and is thus 
synonymous with empowerment for the purpose of this research. Decision making ability is 
comprised of an individual's negotiating ability in influencing outcomes regarding the 
household's allocation to each member of; consumption, expenditure, production, labor, assets, 
education, health, and even violence (Agarwal, 1997; Doss, 2012; Rai and Ravi, 2011; Johnson, 
2005).   
 
2.1 Theoretical Impact of Microfinance 
 Microfinance may impact decision making ability pending the assumption over 
homogenous household preferences. As first introduced in Gary Becker's Unitary Model of the 
Family, each household member's preferences and budget constraint is homogenous (Agarwal, 
1997).  Formally, homogeneity in the Unitary Model of the Family can be modeled as:  
          s. t.                              ,                         .  So 
that all family member's (1, k) utility and production functions,               are equal for 
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individual i of gender g in household h. Every decision maximizes each household members 
utility function and budget constraint since member (1, k)  is identical (Agarwal, 1997). 
Therefore the  recipient of credit and the position and gender of the decision maker is 
irrelevant. Applying Becker's model to microfinance implies that microfinance's targeting of 
women is unnecessary however microfinance still reduces the constraint of the budget of the 
household resulting in a Pareto-optimal positive income effect (Campbell, 2010; Dehejia et al, 
2012).  
  In contrast, the assumption over heterogeneity in a non-unitary model of the family 
tells a different story. The income effect observed through microfinance may not impact each 
individual in the household similarly which is where Pareto-optimality weakens. The same 
maximization problem exists (         s. t.      , however,  all members have differing U and 
Y functions such that                                               . The 
more constrained individual, generally holding lower levels of power, can benefit more from a 
targeted microfinance policy tool. Therefore, a decision can be made efficient so that 
microfinance acts as a mechanism to equalize power (Goetz and Sen Gupta, 1996).  
 Empirically, the heterogeneous model and assumption is observed which allows for 
empowerment to be measured through the decision making ability between spouses. These 
results, under this heterogeneous framework, can be grouped into three factors which impact a 
female's financial decisions and empowerment such as her knowledge and ability, the nature of 
her family ties and her previous levels of intra-spousal power (Agarwal, 1997). In 
understanding these factors, a better model can be constructed later which tests if Jordan has 
similar determinates as other regions. 
 
2.2 Empirical Support 
 Kirchler, et al.'s (2008) theoretical model conjectures that loan take-up is positively 
related to one's knowledge, ability and access to the market as supported by many studies 
(Doss, 2012; Dutta and Magableh, 2006 Fletschner and Mesbah, 2011). As an example, an RCT 
conducted by Ashraf, Karlan and Yin (2010) find that women are more involved in decisions 
when her perception of her financial ability and knowledge increases. Further, women are more 
likely to take loans when they hold assets in Honduras, Jordan and Bangladesh as studied by 
Pellegrina (2011), Dutta and Magableh (2006) and Pitt et al. (2006) respectively. At the same 
time, when women hold assets, such as wealth given upon marriage, they have greater access to 
5 
 
the market and higher levels of intra-spousal power however are less likely to demand capital 
as analyzed by Cheryl Doss (2012).  
 Dutta and Magableh (2006), Kirchler et al (2011) and Fletschner and Carter (2008) find 
that existing levels of disposable income results in lower levels of loan take-up and conjecture 
that employment is a symbol of empowerment  in Jordan, the US and Paraguay, respectively 
(Agarwal, 1997). However, one avenue to credit and power is through income. Thus, if loans 
are taken, a positive income effect will increases the wife's share of disposable income in the 
household, her ability to further take microfinance loans, gather knowledge and demand for 
equal power  (Armend  riz and Morduch, 2005; Ashraf et. al, 2010; Ngo & Wahhaj, 2011;  Pitt 
& Khandker, 1998). Thus, holding a job and contributing income positively impacts a woman's 
decision agency in the home, however negatively impacts her likelihood of taking microfinance 
loans since she can support herself without the credit and is likely already empowered. This 
cycle is one example of the endogenous nature of empowerment and microfinance. 
 An alternative determinate of loan take-up and empowerment lies in familial ties, 
support and structure (Agarwal, 1997; Doss, 2011; Holvoet, 2005). The level of involvement of 
the husband's family in the wife's life, for example, negatively affects the wife's empowerment 
due to the portion of the family that weights the husband's preferences over the wife's' (Doss, 
2012; Holvoet, 2005). Second, the power of the wife can be impacted through the gender 
composition and number of the children once a wife bears a male child (Doss, 2012; Madigan, 
2009). However, a more important determinate of gender empowerment is in the mutual intra-
spousal involvement in family planning (Ashraf et al 2010; Doss, 2012). Further, as Rula 
Quawas (2006) argues, intra-spousal female power comes from the wife's real threat in 
divorcing her husband and is often the only proxy of empowerment (Ngo and Wahhaj, 2011). 
Where often the threat of divorce is modeled as a function of these other aspects such as 
children, income, wealth, education and familial support. 
 Familial ties is often directly related to the husband. For example, when the husband 
has access to credit, the wife is less likely to take loans, as found in Honduras by Vonderlack-
Navarro (2010). Further, the husband's ability to cosign on a loan, as Fletschner and Carter 
(2006) and Doss (2012) point out, implies either credit worthiness, limited access to  credit or 
approval of his wife's loan take-up leaving an ambiguous effect. Further, Dutta and Magableh 
(2006) and Pellegrina (2011) find that when women hold viable cosigners in their familial 
networks they are less likely to take loans. However, as found by numerous studies given an 
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initial level of power, a wife may take-up loans, even if her husband and or networks hold loans 
(Agarwal, 1997; Kirchler, et al; Ngo and Wahhaj, 2011).  
 Thus, previous levels of intra-spousal are a large determining factor of current levels of 
power. For example, Fletschner and Mesbah (2011) find that husbands withhold financial 
information from their wives if the divulgence of this information will result in a male Pareto-
inferior outcome - a finding supported in Ngo and Wahhaj's (2011) decision making framework. 
Numerous other studies find this negative relationship between husband's level of power and 
his wife's level of power as well as loan take up (Ahmed, 2005; Alatiyat & Barari, 2010; 
Fletschner and Carter, 2006). For this reason, most studies include demographic information 
such as sex of head of household, and sex of main income earner, allocation of labor and 
education levels of both spouses (Doss, 2012). 
 Learning from the literature then, the appropriate measure of empowerment for the 
Jordanian context lies in intra-spousal decision making ability. Under a heterogeneous model of 
the family, microfinance may provide an avenue to impact empowerment. The empirical 
evidence points to factors which influence decision outcomes such as knowledge, ability, family 
ties and previous outcomes. From this literature, a method and model can be developed taking 
into account the appropriate contexts, definitions, and factors through microfinance on decision 
making agency in Jordan. 
 
3.   Methodology 
 The methodology is constructed to answer the three parts of this exploratory analysis 
of microfinance and empowerment in Jordan. Mainly, the goal of this research lies in predicting 
first the determinates of microfinance take-up and to see if empowerment predicts take-up as 
well. Upon finding that empowerment measures do determine taking loans, an instrumental 
variable is utilized to resolve the impact of microfinance on empowerment. 
 
3.1   Collecting Data 
 Collection of data was possible through the cooperation of the National Microfinance 
Bank (NMB) in Amman, Jordan throughout the summer of 2012. The bank's operations 
commenced in March 2006 with two goals: induce poverty reducing economic productivity 
through entrepreneurial capital and to specifically focus on improving women's living 
conditions (n.d.). In order to meet these goals, eligibility requirements are kept simple - the 
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client must be from the geographic area within reach of one of the twelve branches, over the 
age of 18 and be able to provide two cosigners. Clients are not required to hold a business 
license or registration.  
 The bank provided information on the loan history of each client. This data includes the 
principle amount of each  loan, the monthly installment amount and the number of installments 
of each loan. Loans range from 200JD to 50,000JD. Additionally, data was collected from a 
microfinance loan intra-institutional information sharing system implemented country wide in 
2009. This data compliments the data gathered from NMB's internal system to provide an 
accurate representation of each clients loan history. Additionally, late history of clients was 
noted with 5% of this sample holding an 'outstanding' status client at one point in time 
implying that clients generally pay back loans. Lastly, the number of cosigners as well as the 
relationships of the cosigners to the clients were noted. 42% of husbands cosigned at some 
point in the wife's history of microfinance. 
 
3.2  Survey Design  
 The second sphere of data collection was generated through the design and 
implementation of a survey. Solicitations of clients included face-to-face requests and phone 
requests. The length of the survey was on average 30 minutes, conducted in Arabic by one of 
the enumerators. Data collection via survey implementation spanned July 3, 2012 through 
August 23, 2012. This timeframe collides with the commencement of Ramadan on July 19, 
2012 however is assumed to have no influence on responses regarding empowerment outcomes. 
 The survey was designed to elicit responses in the following categories; individual and 
household characteristics, risk and time preferences, household purchasing and loan decision 
outcomes, use of loans, household investments, religious sentiments, and intra-spousal power 
structures. The individual and household characteristics gathered mainly elicit age, education, 
and employment of the client her spouse and other members of the household. These questions 
were followed by risk and time preference questions. Questions regarding intra-spousal power 
structures, and decision outcomes were extrapolated from the literature on female 
empowerment and microfinance. Cheryl Doss' (2012) review of the literature's questions and 
structure is a good comprehensive source which these questions were modeled after. Though 
this survey is untested outside of Jordan, the survey was pretested in Jordan to ensure accuracy. 
A copy of the survey can be found in the Section 3 of the Appendix. 
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 The sensitive nature and likely western bias over religious and intra-spousal power 
measures was a concern in designing the survey.  To resolve possible biases, a focus group was 
employed and multiple discussions with the staff of the National Microfinance Bank were held.  
The focus group1, led by one of the enumerators, was held at the National Microfinance Bank 
with select clients of the bank whom the loan officers chose to best reflect the clientele. With 
this information, questions over religion and empowerment  regarded as too sensitive were 
dropped in order to encourage full participation and to maintain a level of respect for the client. 
Another concern of this research was in the possibility of a framing effect, particularly with 
regards to the questions gathered to understand empowerment. To minimize bias, enumerators 
were instructed to encourage honesty so that all responses are assumed to be accurate. 
 
3.3 Sample and Counterfactual Selection 
 Upon finalization of the survey, each client was randomly selected into voluntary 
participation in this study from the various branches of the bank. These branches2 were located 
in; Baqua'a, Deir Alla, Irbid, Karak, Madaba, Mafraq Marka, Salt , Wehdat, and Zarqa. 
However, due to limitations of the bank, Mafraq was inaccessible throughout the span of this 
research. This may pose possible bias in the selection of the sample, however, due to the lack of 
control held over this decision, this bias is one of the limitations of the study and the effect is 
expected to be minimal.  From the remaining branches, random selection of clients was 
maintained.  
 In developing a counterfactual, the majority of the literature looks to eligible non-
borrowers, such as Holvoet (2005) and Osmani (2007), or discontinuous eligibility 
requirements, such as Pitt and Khandker (1998) and Pitt et al (2006). A list of either type of 
counterfactual proved difficult to gather. With a little creativity, a counterfactual is found in 
comparing married female clients at varying points along the lending process.  These points 
can be categorized in the following stages where a client is first eligible then applies for the 
loan, experiences the first loan and then becomes a return or a previous non-returning 
borrower. With the data available for this study, an exploration of previous non-returning 
borrowers and first time/returning borrowers allows for a initial impact of microfinance to be 
seen, or as this research coins the term, "cash-in-hand" self-selected treatment effect. Due to the 
                                                             
1 Protocol for the focus group is found in Section 2 of the Appendix 
2 A map of the branch locations can be found in Section 1 of the Appendix 
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complete loan history of clients from all institutions, high confidence exists in this distinction. 
Thus, a short term impact of microfinance on empowerment can be analyzed in this context.   
 
3.4 Summary Statistics 
 A brief summary of the average client profile is given in Table 1. The cash-in-hand 
treatment is observed for about three fourths of the sample. Approximately half of the sample 
reportedly took loans for a small business and the other half took loans for consumption.  This 
leads to an important assumption of this research, that clients who take loans hold control over 
the loans themselves and despite the use, some level of empowerment is achieved for simply 
holding cash-in-hand.  
 The sample of clients in the dataset hold loans ranging from 200JD to 3,500JD with an 
average loan size of 656 JD ($927 US).  The distribution of loan size can be seen in Figure 1. 
The interest rates range between 20% and 44%. The average number of loans taken is between 
2 and 3 loans. Most clients took loans between 2008 and 2012, and less than 10% of clients took 
loans before 2008. This implies most loans have been taken in the last 5 years and at least one 
loan per client. Note that there is no statistical difference in year of first loan take up, as seen in 
Table 2. 92% of the sample hold loans for a small business, as reported by the bank a loan less 
than 1000JD ($1415 US). A little less than half of the client's husbands cosigned on at least one 
loan and 45% of the client's husband holds a loan currently.  
 The average client takes in 70 JD ($99 US) of income per person per month with the 
average household size of the client hovering 6 members - about 4 children per household. 61% 
of clients self report as unemployed while 20% of their husbands are unemployed. 33% of the 
members in the household are bringing in income with 90% of husbands standing as the main 
income earner. As discussed in the literature, knowledge of the financial market are another 
proxy for empowerment. In this study, this knowledge is elicited through questions on ability 
to name MFIs near the client as well as the services offered and how an MFI was advertised to 
a client. On average, clients can name between 2 and 3 of the 5 closest MFI's to their home, and 
can identify between 1 and 2 of the 4 main services MFIs offer (loans for entrepreneurs, 
women, consumption and education).  
 Of these above characteristics, there are a few which are statistically different from zero 
at or below the 10% level of significance given a cash-in-hand treatment status. As expected, 
income per capita is higher for the control group. The treatment group, on average, has taken 
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more loans and are more likely to hold loans in 2012 which is intuitive. Also, the treatment 
group is more likely to hear about microfinance from a neighbor. Overall, there is little 
difference between the two groups of borrowers, which allows for the assumption of 
homogeneity to hold, when controlling for the above characteristics. 
 
3.5 Measuring Empowerment 
 As discussed in the literature review, the appropriate measure of empowerment in 
Jordan is in the intra-spousal decision making ability. Table 3 displays the t-tests and sample 
averages on these decision outcomes. These decisions are as follows; the first loan, most recent 
loan, small household purchases, large household purchases, and overall decisions. These 
decisions were chosen to measure any short term effect holding cash-in-hand via microfinance 
holds on empowerment (Doss, 2012). As Table 3 shows, there is little difference between the 
defined treatment and control groups. The joint decision over the most recent loan is the only 
statistically significant difference seen by a t-test at the 5% level.  
 
4.  Analysis I: Predicting Loan Take-Up (Model 1)  
 The goal of this first model is to econometrically understand the determinates of loan 
take-up in Jordan due to the limited research on the topic. To approximate the binary, self-
selection likelihood of holding a cash-in-hand treatment, a Probit model is utilized which allows 
for predicted values to remain between 0 and 1 under the assumption of a normal distribution 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). Similarly, authors which use Probit to model loan take-up 
include Fletschner and Carter (2006), Osmani (2007), and Pellegrinia (2011) to name a few.  
 Econometrically, the following model can estimate loan take-up in Jordan: 
                                                                        (1a) 
On the left hand side lies the variable of current loan take-up, or cash-in-hand. Where 
            is a dummy variable taking on the value of 1 if the client holds a current loan. 
Note that the client in either case can previously have held loans3.  A description of the right 
hand side variables is as follows, where   is an error term, assumed to have no covariance with 
any other terms in the model.  
 Use is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the loans are used for a business, self-reported.  
                                                             
3 Refer to Table 2 for t-tests on loan take-up by year, by type of client 
11 
 
 LStruct is the interest rate of the first loan, which represents the terms of the loan. The 
interest rate is given to a cohort of borrowers at time t, as assigned by the bank given 
the rate in the market. 
 YrL1 is a vector of dummy variables for each year a client first took microfinance.  
 Age is the reported age of the wife in years. 
 Inc is the reported monthly income per capita of the client's household.  
 Emp is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the wife reported no employment defined in the 
survey as either full-time, part-time, or domestic. 
The null hypothesis which predicts no effect,                    . And the alternative 
hypothesis, formally,                       there is a statistically significant difference 
in loan take-up due to variables on the right hand side.  
 
4..1 Analysis of Equation (1a)  
 Table 4 displays the regression output as modeled by Equation (1a). The first three 
columns of Table 4 tease out the determinates of cash-in-hand. These regressions show that the 
LStruct, or the interest rate, does statistically predict a current cash-in-hand treatment status at 
the 1% level, for every level of controls (Columns 1-4)4. The positive coefficient on the interest 
rate of the first loan is unexpected, since price is negatively correlated to demand. However, 
since the sample includes all clients and current clients have a statistically significant higher 
first interest rate, this study makes a conjecture. The explanation could be due to the 
relationship between expected returns and willingness to pay initially. Where only women with 
high returns and ability stay in the game of taking loans, despite the initial high interest rate. 
This is further explained in Section 5.1. Ultimately, the null hypothesis is rejected, and the 
terms of the loan do predict a cash-in-hand treatment. 
 Other factors are estimated to predict currently holding a loan such as taking a second 
loan and income per capita at the 10% level of significance, displayed in Column 3. Where 
income per capita negatively predicts a small cash-in-hand treatment effect and taking a second 
                                                             
4 Note the large and positive coefficient. The inflated coefficient is assumed to be due to multicollinearity with 
some other variables. Other variables that were tested for multicollinearity included income per capita, the dummy 
time variables, and the dummy variable of loan take-up a second time.  Even when these variables were taken out 
of the model, the coefficient was still inflated and remained at the same level of significance. Therefore, interest 




loan positively predicts treatment. Both of these independent variables are intuitive. First, the 
higher income one has, the less likely one is to take out a loan. Second, the more loans one has 
already taken, the more likely one is to continue taking loans. This may even be due to the 
success of previous loans as discussed in Section 2.4.  
 Overall, the implications of Model 1, Equation (1a) is that married women take loans 
given the terms of the loan, income, and previous loan history.  However, Equation (1a) likely is 
not the end of this story due to the literature and intuition which implies some endogeneity 
story, such as initial levels of empowerment affecting this decision, Equation (1b), then can be 
used to analyze this effect. This can be seen in Column 4 of Table 4. As expected, the variables 
which are included to proxy for levels of empowerment are statistically significant. 
 
4.2 Introducing Empowerment, Equation (1b) 
 This next segment of the econometric model tests determinates of microfinance cash-in-
hand treatment by including empowerment as a determinate. This is of importance because a 
positive effect between microfinance and empowerment is often found however causality is 
difficult to determine due to the likely endogenous impact of previous levels of empowerment 
(Vonderlack-Navarro, 2010). Further, authors argue that an unobserved variable such as ability 
likely impact loan take-up and empowerment together giving popularity to techniques in the 
literature such as the instrumental variable approach (Fletschner & Carter, 2008; Pellegrina, 
2011; Pitt, et al. 2006; Tedeschi, 2008). Thus, Equation (1a) is amended to include a measure of 
empowerment, Pwr, to test for endogeneity.   
 This vector of empowerment, Pwr, is comprised of three dimensions. The first is in the 
dimension which attributes intra-spousal power to the sex of children. Therefore, there is a 
dummy variable for the sex of the first and last child (1=male).  The second dimension provides 
a proxy of the wife's knowledge which is comprised of her knowledge of the financial market, 
level of education, and level of education compared to her husband. The last dimension 
measures the overall decision maker between spouses (the wife, husband, or jointly): 
                                                                          
                                                                                                                         (1b) 
The additional null hypothesis of interest is         which states empowerment is not a 
statistically significant variable predicting current borrowing status. The alternative 
hypothesis,        , predicts that empowerment has explanatory power in current loan 
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holding (Cashinhand). If the coefficient on the empowerment vector,  , is significant, then 
empowerment is indeed an endogenous regressor, as seen in the literature. Thus, endogeneity 
needs to be accounted for in Model 2. 
 
4.2.1 Analysis of Model 1, Equation (1b) 
 The last column of Table 4 displays the results of Model 1, Equation (1b). Of these added 
variables, financial knowledge, sex of first and last child, and empowerment levels are 
statistically significant. Equation (1b) then predicts multiple aspects to empowerment that 
endogenously affect loan take-up decisions - the goal of this part of the analysis. Thus, 
endogeneity is equally relevant in Jordan and should be accounted for when predicting 
empowerment outcomes given cash-in-hand treatment status, estimated in Section 5. 
 For example, the wife is 10% more likely to take loans for each additional point of her 
financial knowledge index, at the 5 % level of significance5. However, the wife's level of 
education and her level of education with respect to her husband does not statistically impact 
her decision to take a loan. Second, if the first born child is male, the wife is 30% more likely to 
hold a loan currently. However, if the last child born is male, the wife is almost 40% less likely 
to be holding loans currently.  Lastly, a more direct proxy of empowerment is the overall 
decision maker at the time of the first loan as recalled by the wife. This study finds that the wife 
is 32% more likely to hold loans currently if she is the main decision maker at the 1% level of 
significance, and 65% more likely to hold loans currently if she and her husband decide jointly, 
at the 1% level of significance. The intuition for these results upholds much of the literature, 
where a female is more likely to take loans as she knows more about her options, have higher 
levels of power and ability to take loans if the first born child is male due to social preference 
for males, and that the household operating in a cooperative framework is more likely to 
provide means of economic opportunity to women, which is a simple explanation for the larger 




                                                             
5 This index variable takes on one additional numeric value for each MFI near the wife which she can name 
correctly (closest MFIs       ), for each service the wife can name that microfinance offers (services       ), and 
for each social source the wife hear about microfinance from (sources       ) 
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5.  Analysis II: Predicting Empowerment via Cash-in-Hand (Model 2) 
 As Model 1 estimates, empowerment endogenously predicts a self-selected cash-in-hand 
treatment status of clients. This reverse causality story is resolved through the instrumental 
variable estimation technique. Though the sample size is small, which may have limiting effects 
on an analysis under an IV estimation, IV is chosen over the alternative (any matching 
technique) in order to account for any endogenous and omitted third variable. When looking 
for an instrument, Model 1 estimates that interest rates predict treatment, all else equal, and 
should not predict empowerment and decision outcomes. Thus, interest rate of the first loan 
can be utilized as an instrumental variable for further estimation. Remember that interest rates 
are set by the bank due to the market and given to a cohort of borrowers at time t, which 
fluctuates with the market rate. Also, the first interest rate is independent of income or the 
amount of the loan. 
 As seen in Equation (1b), there is a positive relationship between the interest rate and 
cash-in-hand. The intuition for this can be explained through profitability. It is likely that take-
up, at these first level of prices, only occurs under profitable conditions. For example, the client 
is more likely to take loans if the expectations of profit are equal to or less than the realized 
outcome (Kirchler et al, 2011). Further, as found by Pellegrina (2011), Fletschner and Carter 
(2006) and Dutta and Magableh (2006) previous success of entrepreneurial capital has a 
positive effect on demand for current capital in Honduras, Paraguay and Jordan, respectively. 
Therefore, a client is more likely to stay a current borrower and self-select into the cash-in-
hand treatment given the interest rate of the first loan. Though the return on interest may be 
related to income, ability, or knowledge these are controlled for and thus, interest rates predict 
a client taking loans currently or not. 
 
5.1 Further Notes on IV 
 As Deaton (2009) points to, the most important aspect of using the debated 
instrumental variable technique is in holding to the assumptions of IV.  These assumptions are 
as follows; (1) the covariance between the instrument, Z, and the error term, u, is zero. In other 
words, the instrument itself must be exogenous to the error term, otherwise, the problem 
persists. (2) the instrument, Z, must be correlated with the endogenous regressor,   , and only 
correlated, some argue even causal, to the left hand side variable,    through   . (3) the 
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instrument, Z, must not be an omitted variable in predicting the left hand side variable   . 
Formally, this is known as the exclusion restriction. 
 Interest rates as an instrument, Z, for the endogenous regressor of Cashinhand,     
upholds the above assumptions. A simple t-test6 between interest rate of the first loan and 
Cashinhand show that interest rate of the first loan predicts variability of the dependent 
variable. Figure 1 supports these claims, graphically showing that there is statistical 
significance and difference. Further, as shown in Table 5, the first stage regressions maintain 
the level of significance. Maintaining these controls, there is no theoretical reason interest rates 
predict empowerment measures except through taking loans. Another important aspect to note 
when using IV as argued by Imbens (2009) lies in the heterogeneity and the estimated effect 
although identification and interpretation may be problematic. Imbens argues that an average 
treatment effect can be estimated for a well defined subpopulation, for which this research has 
noted already as married women microfinance borrowers. Thus, the estimates on Cashinhand,  
through IV can be seen as the local average treatment effect for previous and current 
microfinance borrowers who take loans due to their experience with their first interest rates. 
Thus, interest rate of the first loan upholds the assumptions of an instrumental variable. 
 
5.2 Model 2, Equation (2) 
 Two Stage Least Squares estimation technique is most appropriate for constructing 
Model 2. The first stage is basically Model 1, a Probit model, and the second stage is an IV 
Linear Probability model. The IV regression is chosen over an IV Probit model due to the 
easier interpretation and consistencies found in LP models over Probit models during the 
second stage as discussed by Osmani (2007). The dependent variable to proxy for female 
empowerment lies in the outcomes of intra-spousal household decision made by the husband, 
wife, or both spouses jointly: of outcomes, j, for individual i made by spouse s labeled as 
           . Explicitly, these outcomes are based on who reportedly made the decision over the 
first loan, the most recent loan (despite loan take-up), small household purchases (such as 
clothing), large household purchases (such as a motor vehicle) and the decisions overall. Thus, 
Model 2 is: 
                 
                                                             (2) 
                                                             
6 The  two-tailed t-test is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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 The variable of interest is in the estimated coefficient on the fitted values of Cashinhand, 
     The null hypothesis,      
       is that there is no statistically significant difference in 
both autarkic and cooperative decision making equilibriums via microfinance. The alternative 
hypothesis,      
       is that there is a statistically significant difference. Additionally, the 
vector of control variables,    include; age, education level, employment status, decision making 
power at the time of the first loan, and the level of knowledge of the financial market of the wife 
respondent. The vector of household characteristics,     include first born child is male, income 
per capita, gap in age between the spouses, if the husband is cosigner on any loan, the husband's 
decision making power at the time of the first loan, and the husbands employment status. The 
last control variable is a vector of time dummies, YrL1, indicating the year of the first 
microfinance loan taken by the wife.  
  
5.3 Analysis of Model 2 
 Table 4A displays the first stage results of the IV regressions which demonstrate the 
strength and significance of the IV. This table shows that the interest rate of the first loan 
positively predicts cash-in-hand treatment at the 1% level of significance. Further, the F-Test 
on the strength of the instrument exceeds the threshold of 10 at the 1% level of significance 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). Table 6-10 display the OLS and IV regressions in predicting 
Model 2 for each type of decision, made in autarky (columns 2 and 5 for each table) or in 
cooperation (columns 6 and 7 for each table). The last row in the table titled, "P>Wald Test 
Chi2," is the P value reported for the Wald test of exogeneity for IV (where the null hypothesis 
is that there is no exogeneity). As this value becomes closer to 1, the problem of endogeneity is 
resolved more confidently through the use of the interest rate of the first loan as an instrument. 
Also note that the R-square is the Adjusted R-square for OLS regressions and the reported R-
square from the IV 2SLS regressions.  
 Looking at the explanatory power of the regressions found in Tables 6-10 it is important 
to note the small sample size of 86 clients and the large number of covariates (19) controlled for 
in these regressions. Lack of significance may be due to the small sample size and large number 
of controls. Further, on top of the large degrees of freedom, an instrumental variable is utilized, 
which also takes away from the explanatory power of the regressions. Thus, to see any effect on 




5.3.1 Decision Over the First Loan 
 Looking at Table 6, the outcomes on decision agency is seen to be statistically 
significant for the husband making this decision alone when using IV however, there is no 
significance in the OLS coefficient and the 10% level of significance in the IV coefficient. This 
may be explained by the failure to reject the null hypothesis on the Wald test of exogeneity, 
where the p-value is equal to 0.06. Thus, the IV approach did not resolve the problem of 
endogeneity, and thus, this coefficient may not be as accurate as desired. These regressions do 
show that initial levels of empowerment effect loan take up currently. This is also supported by 
the statistically significant coefficients on the "Wife Autarkic Power at 1st Loan" and "Husband 
Autarkic Power at 1st Loan" variables.  Therefore, this research concludes that, though initial 
levels of empowerment impact the decision agency of spouses on the first loan take-up, 
microfinance is not impacting this type of outcome and the null hypothesis is accepted. 
 The only other variables to note which add explanatory power to the decision outcomes 
over the first loan are the age of the wife and the year of first loan take up (2010). As the wife 
ages by one year, she is 1% less likely to have decided on the first loan with her husband jointly. 
This is intuitive because empowerment and cooperative outcomes are more likely over time, or 
with younger married women. Also, if the loan was taken in the first year in 2010, then the 
decision over the first loan is 42% more likely to have been made by the husband. This effect 
could be capturing some macroeconomic effect such as the recent recession or the Arab Spring.  
 
5.3.2 Decision Over the Most Recent Loan 
 Table 7 displays the results for the most recent loan decision outcomes7. The rather 
small sample size may explain why there is no statistical significance found on the cash-in-hand 
self-selected treatment. However, many other variables are significant, These variables include 
taking a loan first in 2010, 2008, 2007, the age of the wife, the age gap between spouses, first 
born child is male, financial know-how, spousal empowerment levels at the time of the first loan 
and husband cosigning a microfinance loan. The significance of these variables show that 
empowerment factors are impacting cooperative or autarkic decision agency between spouses. 
 Other points to note on these regressions, and the explanatory power, come from 
examining the Adj. R-square and the p-value from the Wald test of exogeneity. From the R-
square, looking at the values on the Adjusted R-square from the OLS regressions which take 
                                                             
7 Note that the sample size is smaller - clients who took only one loans are dropped from these regressions. 
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into account the degrees of freedom with penalty for adding variables, is more realistic as to the 
explanatory power these regressions hold - which explains at most one third of the data. 
Looking at the Wald test of exogeneity, the only endogeneity resolved is through the husband 
deciding on the most recent loan. The other two outcomes still are endogenous due according 
to the Wald test. Overall then, this research would fail to reject the null hypothesis for Model 2 
for this type of decision and there is no cash-in-hand impact. 
 
5.3.3 Decision Over Small Household Purchases 
 The decision over small household purchases seems to be the most impacted outcome 
due to microfinance's cash-in-hand treatment effect. Table 8 displays the results which predict 
that a wife holding a loan currently implies the husband to be 29% more likely to make small 
household purchasing decisions. This could be due to her involvement outside of the home in 
her small business which requires the husband to now make daily decisions at home. Also, the 
p-value on the exogeneity test, the value is greater than the 15% level, which implies that the 
null hypothesis of endogeneity can be rejected, and the problem has been resolved due to the 
use of IV. Thus, the null hypothesis is rejected for the husband making decisions on small 
household purchases and microfinance seems to be impacting the intra-spousal decision making 
agency outcomes.  
 Other explanatory variables in decision outcomes include empowerment variables, 
which further shows that previous empowerment strongly effects current empowerment in 
Jordan. For example, the wife's power at the time of the first loan is a proxy for previous 
empowerment. Note that this variable is positively predicting the husband making decisions on 
small purchasing. Thus, under this thought, holding a microfinance loan may actually be 
reinforcing the wife's power in the husband making small decisions in the home, since both are 
predicting a positive likelihood. What is interesting, is that the time dummies and number of 
loans taken are negatively predicting the husband making this decision. For example, as the 
wife takes more loans, her husband is less likely to be making decisions over small purchases 
which may just be capturing some trend in empowerment over time. 
 
5.3.4 Decision Over Large Household Purchases 
 Decisions over large purchases are not impacted by microfinance's cash-in-hand effects 
as seen in Table 9. Other empowerment variables which predict this outcome are if the first 
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born child is male, if the wife is unemployed and the initial spousal decision making levels.  For 
example, if the first born child is male, the husband is 34% more likely to make the decisions 
over large household purchases. One explanation could be due to power given to men in the 
home as more men are in the home, as is often seen in the literature. Although, generally, 
having a first born male gives women a higher position. Perhaps, this shows that having a first 
born son does not hold the same implications in Jordan. Also, if the wife is unemployed, the 
husband is 29% less likely to make the decision over large purchases. This could be due to the 
wife being at home and the husband being away at work. Or if the husband holds the initial 
decision making agency, he is 30% more likely to make this decision - as is intuitive. Lastly, if 
the wife is older than the husband, a cooperative decision is more likely, which is intuitive since 
age tends to be related to respect.  
 Looking at the explanatory power, there still remains endogeneity in the decision made 
by the husband, however the other two outcomes can reject the null of no exogeneity. Also, 
looking at the goodness of fit measures, the R-Square and Adjusted R-Square, at most these 
regressions explains one third of the 88 clients, which may just be due to the large number of 
covariates on the right hand side. Overall, Table 9 shows that microfinance does not hold any 
impact on the decision outcomes over large purchases between spouses. Therefore, this 
research fails to reject the null hypothesis. There is no cash-in-hand effects of microfinance on 
large purchasing decisions. 
 
5.3.5 Decision Overall 
 Looking at the last table, Table 10, overall decision outcomes of intra-spousal decision 
agency,  the null hypothesis of this research is once again accepted. As seen in the other 
decision outcomes, there are some alternate empowerment factors, such as if the husband is 
unemployed or the initial decision making agency of spouses, which negatively impacts a joint 
decision, or the husband's initial power which positively effects his agency. The findings state 
that when the husband holds the power initially, cooperation is less likely, as predicted in the 
literature. Also, if the husband is unemployed, though he is contributing less income to the 
family, it can easily be assumed that he is at home more and more likely to make decisions in 
the household purchases. The positive coefficient on the husband cosigning on any previous or 
current loans.  These results suggest that when the husband cosigns on a loan, a cooperative 
overall decision making atmosphere exists in the home.  
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 Lastly, looking to the explanatory power of the models, endogeneity seems to only be 
resolved with confidence for the wife outcome variable. Also, These regressions seem to have 
much less explanatory power than the previous models. This is intuitive since less variables 
seem to have explanatory power on the dependent variable. Thus, overall, this model seems to 
have little explanatory power for the overall decision outcome, and also fails to reject the null 
that there is some cash-in-hand effect due to microfinance. 
 
6.  Discussion 
 Overall, this study fails to reject the null hypothesis, that microfinance holds some cash-
in-hand effect on intra-spousal decision making outcomes outside of daily small household 
decisions.  Thus, by holding cash-in-hand due to microfinance, there is a change in intra-
spousal decisions in the short run. This study is unable to conjecture over a long term effect 
due to the lack of a non-borrowing counterfactual.  Further, these results seem to have low 
explanatory power in predicting decision making outcomes given the data. 
  Looking to improve, there are multiple avenues for this and future studies. First, this 
research worked with a small sample from one MFI based in Amman. Though data was 
gathered on the lending history from multiple MFIs, a more robust sample would include a 
larger number of participants randomly selected from a list of multiple MFIs. This is especially 
important in adding to the explanatory power with the use of instrumental variables which 
takes away some of the power. Second, there are a couple of strong assumptions made by this 
research which may limit the implications. The biggest assumptions is that the wives who take 
loans are then using the loans for their own small business and no external party is involved 
with the wife using the loans. Another assumption is that this study is able to control for all 
heterogeneity between borrowers who hold cash-in-hand currently and those who do not. With 
questions aiming to control for this better, or with an RCT, this issue could be minimized. 
Third, the measurement of empowerment, though following much of the literature, could be 
improved by surveying both the husband and wife and even through a bargaining game out of 
experimental economics. Lastly, the time frame which this study was conducted was very 
limited, lasting a total of three months. Therefore, the data could improve by a repeated survey 
over time, which would add less subjective measure of the dependent variable.  
 Alternatively, in the exploration of determinates to loan take-up and empowerment this 
study does find that empowerment is a contributing factor to decisions of loan take-up, and 
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intra-spousal decisions. The main empowerment factors which seem to drive decision agency 
include employment status, initial decisions making agency, and financial know-how. Including 
a panel dataset ranging years before and after marriage could extremely benefit a future study 
similar to this one.  This suggestion can be seen by the continued statistical significance of long 
term empowerment variables such as first child is male and initial levels of power of the 
spouses. These findings support the literature which in alternate contexts, and adds a unique 
analysis to the Middle East context, specifically, to Jordan, where a gap in research exists. 
 Looking forward, this study offers recommendations for future analysis of microfinance, 
empowerment and the Middle East. The counterfactual analyzed in this study is a unique one 
which can benefit future analysis on true impact of microfinance on empowerment. Any long 
term empowerment may be observed in borrowers who hold loans for  certain periods of time, 
or who continue to hold loans. Therefore, the inclusion of eligible non-borrowers, previous 
borrowers and current borrowers of differing lengths. This new approach to a counterfactual, 
partially implemented by this study, may provide a more efficient manner in analyzing 
empowerment effects. 
 One aspect this study hopes to have contributed to is in the understanding of 
microfinance in Jordan in the context of this dependent variable. While some authors critique a 
lack of economic insight into on-the-ground perspectives, this study took great effort in 
understanding the desires of Jordanian women. Whether women choose to hold equal power to 
men or not, women ultimately want the option of an outlet to choose in Jordan. So when 
examining microfinance in the country, despite direct empowerment impacts,  microfinance 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics, Client Loan Profile 
 
Sample  Mean (Min, Max) T-test (Ha ≠0) 
Loan Status (N=88)     
Current Microfinance Loan Holder 0.77 (0, 1) N/A 
Either Spouse, Current Loan Holder 0.84 (0, 1) N/A 
Spouse, Current Microfinance Loan 
Holder 0.45 (0, 1) 0.35 
Cosigner, Spouse 0.42 (0, 1) 0.58 
Loan Structure (N=88)     
Amount of First Loan 655.68 (250, 3500) 0.32 
Installment Amount of First Loan 54.81 (25, 246) 0.4 
Number of Installments of First Loan 14.13 (12, 28) 0.17 
Interest Rate of First Loan 23.58 (0.2, 0.44) 0.15 
First Loan for Small Business 92.04 (0, 1) 0.58 
Number of Loans Taken* 2.44 (1, 6). 0.08 
Determinates of Loan Take-Up (N=88)     
Income per Capita* 69.46 (0, 214.29) 0.06 
Size of Household 5.81 (2, 10) 0.98 
Percent Working Members in Household 0.33 (0, 0.85) 0.35 
Number of Children in Household 3.72 (0, 8) 0.82 
Wife, Unemployed 0.61 (0, 1) 0.24 
Husband, Unemployed 0.2 (0, 1) 0.19 
Husband, Main Income Earner 89.77 (0, 1) 0.29 
Loans For Business 0.46 (0, 1) 0.89 
Loans  For Income/Consumption 0.48 (0, 1) 0.46 
Loans  For Husband 0.02 (0, 1) 0.43 
Identify MFIs 2.61 (0, 5) 0.81 
Identify Services of MFIs 1.62 (0, 3) 0.18 
Identify MF for Entrepreneurs 0.85 (0, 1) 0.45 
Identify MF for Women 0.14 (0, 1) 0.21 
Identify MF for Consumption 0.4 (0, 1) 0.72 
Hear of MF via Friends 0.41 (0, 1) 0.9 
Hear of MF via Neighbors 0.28 (0, 1) 0.14 
Hear of MF via Family 0.16 (0, 1) 0.29 
Prefer Islamic Microfinance 0.83 (0, 1) 0.33 
















First Loan Take Up (N=88) 
2012 0.03 (0, 1) 0.00 0.04 0.35 
2011 0.39 (0, 1) 0.4 0.38 0.89 
2010 0.18 (0, 1) 0.25 0.16 0.37 
2009 0.13 (0, 1) 0.15 0.12 0.70 
2008 0.14 (0, 1) 0.1 0.15 0.59 
2007 0.06 (0, 1) 0.05 0.06 0.88 
2006 0.05 (0, 1) 0.00 0.06 0.27 
Take Up, Any Loan (N=88) 
2012*** 0.33 (0, 1) 0.05 0.41 0.00 
2011 0.78 (0, 1) 0.75 0.79 0.68 
2010 0.41 (0, 1) 0.55 0.37 0.15 
2009 0.26 (0, 1) 0.3 0.25 0.67 
2008 0.19 (0, 1) 0.15 0.21 0.58 
2007 0.1 (0, 1) 0.05 0.1 0.39 
2006 0.05 (0, 1) 0.00 0.06 0.27 
(P-values: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10) 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics of Dependent Variables 


















Joint Decisions       
     Sample 0.41 0.21 0.24 0.58 0.60 0.57 
     Current Borrowers 0.38 0.27 0.20 0.57 0.59 0.59 
     Previous 
Borrowers 
0.45 0.11 0.31 0.60 0.60 0.56 
Two-way T-Test 0.41 0.04** 0.17 0.73 0.93 0.75 
Wife Decisions 
           Sample 0.50 0.32 0.67 0.08 0.17 0.13 
     Current Borrowers 0.51 0.36 0.21 0.1 0.15 0.09 
     Previous 
Borrowers 
0.49 




0.32 0.22 0.26 0.7 0.35 
Husband Decisions 
           Sample 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.3 0.24 0.29 
     Current Borrowers 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.34 0.25 0.36 
     Previous 
Borrowers 
0.04 
0.04 0.02 0.24 0.23 0.24 
Two-way T-Test 0.77 0.33 0.34 0.27 0.83 0.18 




Table 4: Model  1 
Marginal Fixed Effects of Probit "Cash-In-Hand" 
 Equation (1a) Equation (1b) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Interest Rate of 1st Loan 3.51 7.92 3.19 3.80 
 (0.63)*** (2.14)*** (0.96)*** (1.44)*** 
Use of 1st Loan, for Business  0.12 0.06 0.18 
  (0.29) (0.13) (0.16) 
Year of First Loan  0.11 0.06 0.08 
  (0.09) (0.04) (0.06) 
Took 2+ Loans  0.60 0.43 0.59 
  (0.38) (0.16)* (0.22)*** 
Income per Capita   -0.01 -0.003 
   (0.001)* (0.002)** 
Wife Age   -0.02 -0.02 
   (0.02) (0.01)** 
Wife Unemployed, Dummy   0.01 -0.10 
   (0.33) (0.16) 
Wife Education Level    -0.09 
    (0.10) 
Wife - Husb. Edu. Gap    -0.13 
    (0.08) 
Wife, Financial Knowledge    0.10 
    (0.05)** 
Last Child Male    -0.38 
    (0.16)** 
First Child Male    0.29 
    (0.17)* 
Wife Overall Decision Maker, 
1st Loan 
   0.32 
    (0.10)*** 
Joint Overall Decision Maker, 
1st Loan 
   0.65 
    (0.17)*** 
Pseudo R-Sq 0.31 0.33 0.39 0.58 
N 115 115 99 87 





Table 5: IV Regression, First Stage Results 
Interest Rate of First Loan 2.94 
  (0.90)*** 
Income per capita 0.00 
  (0.00) 
1st Loan 2012 0.60 
  (0.32)* 
1st Loan 2011 0.19 
  (0.21) 
1st Loan 2010 0.26 
  (0.21) 
1st Loan 2009 0.16 
  (0.22) 
1st Loan 2008 0.22 
  (0.22) 
1st Loan 2007 0.17 
  (0.28) 
Number of Loans Total Taken 0.06 
  (0.05) 
Wife Age -0.01 
  (0.01) 
Wife-Husb. Age Gap -0.01 
  (0.01) 
Wife Education Level 0.26 
  (0.68) 
Intra-Spousal Edu. Gap  -0.08 
  (0.05) 
First Born Child is Male 0.10 
  (0.11) 
Female Unemployed -0.01 
  (0.10) 
Male Unemployed 0.28 
  (0.14) 
Financial Knowhow 0.04 
  (0.03) 
Wife Overall Decision Maker at 1st 
Loan 
-0.15 
  0.14  
Husb. Overall Decision Maker at 1st 
Loan 
-0.20 
  (0.12) 
Husband Cosigner on Any Loan -0.09 
  (0.11) 
Constant -0.13 
Adj. R-Sq -0.50 
N 
F-Test on the Instrument 
85 
10.82*** 
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Table 6: Decision Over the First Loan Autarky Cooperation 
 
By Wife By Husband By Wife & Husband 
  OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
Cash-in-Hand -0.10 0.13 0.03 -0.39 0.06 0.27 
  (0.15) (0.35) (0.07) (0.20)* (0.14) (0.33) 
Income per capita 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
1st Loan 2012 0.25 0.10 -0.09 0.19 -0.16 -0.30 
  (0.42) (0.43) (0.20) (0.24) (0.40) (0.40) 
1st Loan 2011 0.31 0.23 -0.07 0.07 -0.26 -0.33 
  (0.27) (0.26) (0.13) (0.15) (0.26) (0.25) 
1st Loan 2010 0.15 0.04 0.21 0.42 -0.34 -0.45 
  (0.27) (0.29) (0.13)* (0.16)** (0.26) (0.27) 
1st Loan 2009 0.29 0.17 -0.12 0.10 -0.16 -0.27 
  (0.27) (0.29) (0.12) (0.17) (0.25) (0.27) 
1st Loan 2008 0.42 0.28 -0.13 0.14 -0.29 -0.42 
  (0.26) (0.31) (0.12) (0.18) (0.25) (0.29) 
1st Loan 2007 -0.38 -0.52 -0.05 0.22 0.44 0.31 
  (0.33) (0.36) (0.15) (0.20) (0.31) (0.34) 
Number of Loans Total Taken 0.05 0.06 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) 
Wife Age 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)* (0.01)* 
Wife-Husb. Age Gap 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Wife Education Level 0.07 0.06 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 
  (0.09) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.07) 
Intra-Spousal Edu. Gap (Wife-Hub) -0.04 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.04 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) 
First Born Child is Male 0.16 0.12 -0.03 0.04 -0.13 -0.16 
  (0.14) (0.13) (0.06) (0.08) (0.13) (0.12) 
Female Unemployed 0.02 0.03 -0.04 -0.06 0.02 0.03 
  (0.13) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06) (0.12) (0.11) 
Male Unemployed 0.07 0.07 -0.09 -0.09 -0.02 -0.02 
  (0.19) (0.17) (0.09) (0.09) (0.18) (0.16) 
Financial Knowhow 0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.05 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) 
Wife Overall Decision Maker, at 1st Loan 0.17 0.19 0.18 0.14 -0.34 -0.32 
  (0.18) (0.16) (0.08)** (0.09) (0.17)* (0.15)** 
Husb. Overall Decision Maker, at 1st Loan 0.00 0.06 -0.08 -0.18 0.08 0.13 
  (0.16) (0.16) (0.07) (0.09)* (0.15) (0.15) 
Husb. Cosign Any Loan -0.17 -0.16 0.06 0.05 0.10 0.11 
  (0.14) (0.13) (0.07) (0.07) (0.13) (0.12) 
Constant -0.61 -0.70 0.09 0.27 1.54 1.44 
  (0.60) (0.55) (0.28) (0.31) (0.57)*** (0.52)*** 
R-Sq. (Adjusted) -0.05 0.17 0.12 0 0.04 0.24 
N 86 86 86 86 85 85 







(Standard errors reported in parenthesis, p Values p<0.10* P<0.05** p<0.01***, p-value on first 




Table 7: Decision Over Recent Loan Autarky Cooperation 
 
By Wife By Husband By Wife & Husband 
  OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
Cash-in-Hand -0.16 -0.15 -0.05 -0.20 0.20 0.08 
  (0.15) (0.34) (0.05) (0.12) (0.14) (0.31) 
Income per capita 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
1st Loan 2011 0.05 0.05 -0.02 0.02 0.17 0.20 
  (0.25) (0.23) (0.08) (0.08) (0.22) (0.20) 
1st Loan 2010 -0.08 -0.08 -0.01 0.04 0.47 0.51 
  (0.24) (0.22) (0.08) (0.08) (0.21)** (0.20)** 
1st Loan 2009 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 0.02 0.31 0.34 
  (0.22) (0.20) (0.07) (0.07) (0.20) (0.18)* 
1st Loan 2008 0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.05 0.69 0.75 
  (0.22) (0.24) (0.07) (0.09) (0.20)*** (0.22)*** 
1st Loan 2007 -0.09 -0.10 -0.10 0.00 0.54 0.62 
  (0.27) (0.31) (0.09) (0.11) (0.24)** (0.28)** 
Number of Loans Total Taken -0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) 
Wife Age 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Wife-Husb. Age Gap -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)* 
Wife Education Level -0.06 -0.06 0.02 0.03 -0.04 -0.04 
  (0.08) (0.07) (0.03) (0.02) (0.07) (0.06) 
Intra-Spousal Edu. Gap (Wife-Hub) 0.03 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.03 0.02 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02)* (0.05) (0.05) 
First Born Child is Male 0.14 0.14 0.04 0.06 -0.38 -0.36 
  (0.13) (0.11) (0.04) (0.04) (0.11)*** (0.10)*** 
Female Unemployed -0.21 -0.21 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.09 
  (0.12)* (0.10)** (0.04) (0.03) (0.10) (0.09) 
Male Unemployed -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 0.15 0.15 
  (0.17) (0.14) (0.05) (0.05) (0.15) (0.12) 
Financial Knowhow -0.04 -0.04 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.07 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.01)** (0.01)*** (0.03)** (0.03)** 
Wife Overall Decision Maker, at 1st Loan 0.72 0.72 0.01 0.06 -0.13 -0.10 
  (0.18)*** (0.18)*** (0.06) (0.06) (0.16) (0.16) 
Husb. Overall Decision Maker, at 1st Loan 0.32 0.32 0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 
  (0.14)** (0.13)** (0.04) (0.04) (0.12) (0.11) 
Husb. Cosign Any Loan 0.12 0.12 0.07 0.06 -0.19 -0.20 
  (0.13) (0.11) (0.04) (0.04) (0.12) (0.10)** 
Constant 0.57 0.56 -0.20 -0.08 0.24 0.33 
  (0.56) (0.53) (0.18) (0.19) (0.50) (0.48) 
R-Sq. (Adjusted) 0.27 0.49 -0.04 0.11 0.33 0.52 
N 65 65 65 65 65 65 







(Standard errors reported in parenthesis, p Values p<0.10* P<0.05** p<0.01***, p-value on first stage IV 
regressor (interest rate of first loan) 0.002, First Loan in 2012 not included due to collinearity) 
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Table 8: Decision Over Small 
Household Purchases Autarky Cooperation 
 
By Wife By Husband 
By Wife & 
Husband 
  OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
Cash-in-Hand 0.26 0.06 0.11 0.29 -0.25 -0.29 
  (0.14)* (0.32) (0.06)* (0.15)* (0.13)* (0.30) 
Income per capita 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
1st Loan 2012 0.13 0.25 -0.35 -0.47 0.19 0.21 
  (0.39) (0.39) (0.17)** (0.18)** (0.36) (0.36) 
1st Loan 2011 0.34 0.41 -0.33 -0.39 -0.04 -0.03 
  (0.25) (0.24)* (0.11)*** (0.11)*** (0.24) (0.23) 
1st Loan 2010 0.14 0.23 -0.20 -0.29 -0.01 0.01 
  (0.25) (0.26) (0.11)* (0.12)** (0.23) (0.24) 
1st Loan 2009 0.20 0.30 -0.27 -0.36 0.03 0.05 
  (0.25) (0.26) (0.11)** (0.12)*** (0.23) (0.24) 
1st Loan 2008 0.05 0.17 -0.23 -0.34 0.04 0.06 
  (0.24) (0.28) (0.11)** (0.13)*** (0.23) (0.26) 
1st Loan 2007 -0.12 0.01 -0.06 -0.18 0.14 0.17 
  (0.30) (0.33) (0.13) (0.15) (0.28) (0.31) 
Number of Loans Total Taken 0.12 0.11 -0.05 -0.05 -0.07 -0.08 
  (0.05)** (0.05)** (0.02)** (0.02)** (0.05) (0.04)* 
Wife Age -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Wife-Husb. Age Gap 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Wife Education Level 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
  (0.08) (0.07) (0.04) (0.03) (0.08) (0.07) 
Intra-Spousal Edu. Gap (Wife-Hub) 0.09 0.07 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) 
First Born Child is Male -0.08 -0.05 0.04 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 
  (0.13) (0.12) (0.06) (0.06) (0.12) (0.11) 
Female Unemployed -0.04 -0.05 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
  (0.12) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05) (0.11) (0.10) 
Male Unemployed -0.17 -0.17 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 
  (0.17) (0.15) (0.08) (0.07) (0.16) (0.14) 
Financial Knowhow -0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03 
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Wife Overall Decision Maker, at 1st Loan -0.10 -0.12 0.13 0.14 0.06 0.06 
  (0.17) (0.15) (0.07)* (0.07)** (0.16) (0.14) 
Husb. Overall Decision Maker, at 1st Loan -0.04 -0.09 -0.06 -0.01 0.17 0.16 
  (0.15) (0.15) (0.07) (0.07) (0.14) (0.14) 
Husb. Cosign Any Loan 0.12 0.11 0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.04 
  (0.13) (0.12) (0.06) (0.05) (0.12) (0.11) 
Constant 0.54 0.63 0.23 0.15 0.27 0.28 
  (0.56) (0.51) (0.25) (0.24) (0.52) (0.47) 
R-Sq. (Adjusted) -0.02 0.20 0.01 0.15 -0.06 0.19 
N 85 85 85 85 85 85 







(Standard errors reported in parenthesis, p Values p<0.10* P<0.05** p<0.01***, p-value on first stage IV 
regressor (interest rate of first loan) 0.002) 
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  Autarky Cooperation 
Table 9: Decision Over Large  By Wife By Husband By Wife & Husband 
Household Purchases  OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
Cash-in-Hand 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.36 0.02 -0.22 
  (0.07) (0.16) (0.12) (0.28) (0.14) (0.33) 
Income per capita 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
1st Loan 2012 -0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.19 -0.17 -0.01 
  (0.19) (0.19) (0.33) (0.34) (0.40) (0.41) 
1st Loan 2011 -0.06 -0.04 -0.18 -0.27 0.07 0.16 
  (0.12) (0.12) (0.21) (0.21) (0.26) (0.25) 
1st Loan 2010 -0.11 -0.08 -0.19 -0.33 0.07 0.19 
  (0.12) (0.13) (0.21) (0.23) (0.26) (0.27) 
1st Loan 2009 -0.03 0.01 -0.19 -0.33 -0.15 -0.02 
  (0.12) (0.13) (0.21) (0.23) (0.25) (0.27) 
1st Loan 2008 -0.04 0.00 0.07 -0.10 0.11 0.26 
  (0.12) (0.14) (0.20) (0.24) (0.25) (0.29) 
1st Loan 2007 -0.17 -0.13 -0.17 -0.35 0.28 0.43 
  (0.15) (0.16) (0.25) (0.28) (0.31) (0.34) 
Number of Loans Total Taken 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
Wife Age 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Wife-Husb. Age Gap -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.03 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)** (0.01)** 
Wife Education Level 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 -0.05 -0.05 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) 
Intra-Spousal Edu. Gap (Wife-Hub) 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.04 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
First Born Child is Male -0.05 -0.04 0.38 0.34 -0.20 -0.16 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.11)*** (0.10)*** (0.13) (0.13) 
Female Unemployed 0.06 0.06 -0.30 -0.29 0.24 0.23 
  (0.06) (0.05) (0.10)*** (0.09)*** (0.12)* (0.11)** 
Male Unemployed -0.01 -0.01 0.13 0.13 -0.06 -0.06 
  (0.09) (0.08) (0.15) (0.13) (0.18) (0.16) 
Financial Knowhow -0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.00 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Wife Overall Decision Maker, at 1st Loan 0.13 0.13 -0.08 -0.06 0.04 0.02 
  (0.08) (0.07)* (0.14) (0.13) (0.17) (0.16) 
Husb. Overall Decision Maker, at 1st Loan 0.14 0.13 0.23 0.30 -0.21 -0.27 
  (0.07)* (0.07)* (0.12)* (0.13)** (0.15) (0.15)* 
Husb. Cosign Any Loan 0.10 0.09 -0.14 -0.13 0.01 0.00 
  (0.07) (0.06) (0.11) (0.10) (0.13) (0.12) 
Constant -0.05 -0.02 0.21 0.09 1.04 1.15 
  (0.28) (0.25) (0.47) (0.44) (0.57)* (0.52)** 
R-Sq. (Adjusted) -0.02 0.21 0.19 0.33 -0.01 0.19 
N 86 86 86 86 86 86 







(Standard errors reported in parenthesis, p Values p<0.10* P<0.05** p<0.01***, p-value on first stage IV 





Table 10: Decision Overall Autarky Cooperation 
 
By Wife By Husband By Wife & Husband 
  OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
Cash 0.05 -0.20 -0.16 -0.13 0.11 0.33 
  (0.09) (0.23) (0.12) (0.28) (0.14) (0.33) 
Income per capita 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
1st Loan 2012 -0.38 -0.21 0.03 0.01 0.34 0.20 
  (0.27) (0.28) (0.34) (0.34) (0.39) (0.40) 
1st Loan 2011 -0.22 -0.13 -0.09 -0.10 0.31 0.23 
  (0.17) (0.17) (0.22) (0.21) (0.25) (0.25) 
1st Loan 2010 -0.13 0.00 -0.09 -0.11 0.22 0.11 
  (0.17) (0.19) (0.22) (0.23) (0.25) (0.27) 
1st Loan 2009 -0.13 0.00 -0.07 -0.09 0.20 0.08 
  (0.17) (0.19) (0.22) (0.23) (0.25) (0.27) 
1st Loan 2008 0.15 0.31 -0.12 -0.14 -0.03 -0.17 
  (0.17) (0.20) (0.21) (0.25) (0.24) (0.29) 
1st Loan 2007 -0.07 0.09 -0.20 -0.23 0.28 0.14 
  (0.21) (0.23) (0.27) (0.29) (0.31) (0.33) 
Number of Loans Total Taken -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.07 0.08 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)*   
Wife Age -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Wife-Husb. Age Gap 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Wife Education Level -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 -0.06 0.07 0.07 
  (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) 
Intra-Spousal Edu. Gap (Wife-Hub) 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.03 -0.07 -0.05 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
First Born Child is Male 0.04 0.08 0.10 0.10 -0.14 -0.18 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.12) 
Female Unemployed -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 0.10 0.11 
  (0.08) (0.07) (0.10) (0.09) (0.12) (0.10) 
Male Unemployed 0.04 0.04 0.28 0.28 -0.32 -0.32 
  (0.12) (0.11) (0.15)* (0.13)** (0.17)* (0.15)**  
Financial Knowhow 0.03 0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Wife Overall Decision Maker, at 1st Loan 0.15 0.13 -0.25 -0.25 0.10 0.12 
  (0.12) (0.11) (0.15)* (0.13)* (0.17) (0.15) 
Husb. Overall Decision Maker, at 1st Loan -0.05 -0.11 0.46 0.47 -0.41 -0.35 
  (0.10) (0.11) (0.13)*** (0.13)*** (0.15)*** (0.15)**  
Husband Cosign Any Loan -0.12 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 0.25 0.26 
  (0.09) (0.08) (0.12) (0.10) (0.13)* (0.12)**  
Constant 0.47 0.58 0.79 0.77 -0.25 -0.35 
  (0.38) (0.36) (0.49) (0.44)* (0.56) (0.51) 
R-Sq. (Adjusted) -0.03 0.13 0.17 0.36 0.06 0.26 
N 86 86 86 86 86 86 







(Standard errors reported in parenthesis, p Values p<0.10* P<0.05** p<0.01***, p-value on first stage IV 
regressor (interest rate of first loan) 0.002) 
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Figure 1: Average Loan Size, by Cash-in-Hand Status 

















































































































































































Figure 2: Average Responses to Decisionijs Outcomes  





















First Loan Interest Rate
Graphs by Participant Holds Current MFI Loan Including Sharing System [0=No 1=Yes]
Figure 3: Interest Rate of First Loan, by Cash-in-Hand Status 
(Left-Previous Borrowers (0), zero cash-in-hand, Right-Current Borrowers (1), cash-in-hand) 
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Section 2: Focus Group Protocol  
Focus Group Discussion 
 
Thank you for coming today. The goal of this discussion group is to better understand the 
characteristics of the clients of National Microfinance Bank. The topics we will discuss are 
sources of income, knowledge of financial opportunities, knowledge of investment 
opportunities, religious affiliations and sentiments, risk and time preferences and community 
characteristics.  
 
We are interested in knowing your thoughts and your opinion in relation to yourself but more 
so of your community. Please keep in mind your own observations in addition to the 
observations of your family and your neighbors when answering these questions.  
 There are no wrong answers but rather different viewpoints.  Please feel free to share your 
opinion even if it differs from what others have said.  Keep in mind that we are just as 
interested in negative comments as well as positive comments and at times negative comments 
are the most helpful. 
 
I want to remind you that everything in this survey is kept strictly confidential. Also, 
participation in this survey is completely voluntary. You are free to decline to be in this study, 
or to withdraw from it at any point. Remember that your decision as to whether or not to 
participate in this study will have no influence on your present or future status as a loanee. 
 
First, I will need you to go over a consent form and sign it to ensure that we have your consent 
and that you understand our purpose today.  
 
Let’s begin.  We can start by going around the table and introducing ourselves by our first 
names.  
These sessions will be recorded to ensure understanding of your answers. 
 
Does anyone have any questions? (If no, move on, If yes, answer the questions). 
First we want to better understand this community as a whole.  
 What are the boundaries of this community? 
 What would you say is the average income per family in this area? 
 Do you think there are more men than female or female than male or same amount of 
female male in this area? 
 What is the average years of schooling in this community? 
 What types of government aide come to this area? Explain. 
 What types of taxes are paid by people here? Explain. 
 How involved is the government in the community? For example with roads, schooling, 
water and trash systems, etc? 
 
We are also interested in knowing about the sources of income in this community. 
 
 What are the main sources of income for families?  
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 When people own a business, is this business their main source of income? 
 If not, what are typical  main sources of incomes? 
 What type of business do people you know typically own? 
 Do people own livestock? 
  If so, what kind of livestock? 
Thank you for this information. Lets discuss loans and financial options more. 
 Do people lend money to others who are not affiliated with banks and charge interest?   
 If so, what is this type of lending called?  
 Do people borrower often from this type of lending? 
 What are typical interest rates or examples of loans and payments? 
 
Now we would like more information on how people invest money when given loans. 
 
 We would like to understand the living condition of people in the area. In general, people 
live in houses with what types of roofs, walls, toilets, floors, etc? 
 Do people in this community typically own or have access to cell phones, tvs, cars, internet, 
etc?  
 When was the last time you made a critical investment for your business?  
 When was the last time you invested in a home improvement project? 
 Was it before or after you have received a microfinance loan? 
 How much of the loan did you use in the investment?  
 Can you give specific amounts? 
 Do you think your investment was profitable/sustainable? 
 Was the project considered to be risky? 
 
We would like to understand individual’s preferences on risk and time. These will further 
enrich our understanding in order to ask culturally relevant questions related to the games and 
surveys that future individuals will participate in. 
 
 What types of decisions do you consider to be “risky” in business? 
 Do people in your community think it is necessary to wear seatbelts while in moving cars?  
 Why or why not? 
 If your friend owned a successful sewing business, would you think that it is a good idea to 
start your own sewing business based off your friend’s success? 
 Why or why not? 
 Do you think it is important to work hard today to enjoy life more in the future? 
 What types of household decisions do the husbands usually make? 
 What types of household decisions do wives usually make? 
 What types of household decisions are usually made jointly?  
 Do other members of the household make decisions for families as well?  
 Who and how? 
 
We are also interested in knowing more about the impact of religion on household decisions in 




 Do you think people in this community would be uncomfortable talking about their religion 
and beliefs individually? 
 Why or why not? 
 What makes someone very religious?  
 If a Muslim individual prays five times a day does that make him more religious than 
another Muslim individual who does not pray five times a day?  
 Why? 
 How important is your religion to everyday life, activities, and interactions with others? 
 Is charging interest rates on a loan considered a sin to you?  
 Why? 
 Would interest rates prevent you from taking out a loan?  
 Why? 
Thank you so much for your time. These answers will be very helpful in our understanding of 




Section 3: Survey 
2012 Entrepreneur Individual Survey  
Microfinance in Jordan 
Directions for the Enumerator: 
 This survey is to be conducted verbally with one participant at a time.  
 Strictly follow the script as written and do not stray away from it.  
 Do not skip any sections unless the participant asks to skip a question and only repeat questions if the 
participant asks you to repeat a question.  
 The survey should last approximately 30-45 minutes. 
 Receive written permission from the participant FIRST per the consent form on the following page. You 
must read and show it to the participant, and receive consent before you can continue the survey.  
The first column is the question number. The second column is the question that you are to read. The third 
column contains the responses you should read, unless otherwise stated. The fourth column is where you write in 
the answer that is given. For example, 'A'. The last column provides instructions on skipping questions if 
necessary. Read everything on these pages as written. All instructions that are not to be read out loud are written 
small and as a subscript. For example "this type of writing is for you only, if it gives you instructions, follow those instructions." 
Best of Luck! 
-The Research Team 
***ALL INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE RESEARCH TEAM AND BY THE RESPONDANT IS  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL BY WRITING YOUR NAME BELOW AND CONDUCTING THE 
SURVEY, YOU AGREE TO THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF THIS INFORMATION*** 
NUMBER  : ______________________   DATE:  _________/___________/_________ 
NAME OF 
ENUMERATOR:___________________________________________________________________________  
NAME OF BRANCH : __________________________________________________________________________ 
START TIME OF SURVEY    ____________ : _____________   END TIME OF SURVEY    ____________ : 
____________ 
DID ANYONE SIT IN ON THE SURVEY? 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
ANY OTHER NOTES: 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
-------------------------------------------------FOR A MEMBER OF THE RESEARCH TEAM ONLY------------------
-------------------------- 
Did the participant complete the experiment as well?    Yes           or             No 
Name of Data Entry Person: 
Date of Data Entry: 
Name of Validation Person: 




INFORMED CONSENT FORM  
Activities and Survey- For Participant 
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO 
CONSENT TO BE A RESEARCH SUBJECT 
Purpose and Background: We are working with researchers in the Department of Economics at the University 
of San Francisco and we are doing a study on microfinance borrowers. Our purpose is to contribute to the limited 
data on Microfinance in Jordan in order to increase the level of understanding of the impact of Microfinance 
Institutions in the Middle East.  
   
I, the participant, am being asked to participate because I am an eligible borrower of the National Microfinance 
Bank (Alwatani). 
 
Procedures - If I agree to be a participant in this study, the following will happen: 
1. I will complete a survey giving basic information regarding me and my family, personal characteristics, 
household financial information, risk and time preferences, decision-making behavior and religious 
affiliation. 
2. I will complete two activities. 
 
Risks and/or Discomforts - 
1. It is possible that some of the questions within the survey may make me feel uncomfortable, but I am free to 
decline to answer any questions I do not wish to answer or to stop participation at any time.  
2. Participation in research may mean a loss of confidentiality. Study records will be kept as confidential as is 
possible. No individual identities will be used in any reports or publications resulting from the study. 
Study information will be coded and kept in locked files at all times. Only study personnel will have 
access to the files.  
3. Because the time required for my participation may be up to 45 minutes, I may become tired or bored. 
 
Benefits- There will be no direct benefit to me from participating in this study. The anticipated benefit of this 
study is a better understanding of microfinance borrowers. 
 
Costs/Financial Considerations-There will be no financial costs to me as a result of taking part in this study. 
 
Questions- I have spoke to the researcher or the assistant about this study and have had my questions answered. 
If I have further questions about the study, I may call her at 799468974 or e-mail her at 
dsaburish@dons.usfca.edu. If I have any questions or comments about participation in this study, I should first 
talk to the researchers. If for some reason I do not wish to do this, I may contact the IRBPHS, which is concerned 
with protection of volunteers in research projects. I may reach the IRBPHS office by calling +1 (415) 422-6091 
and leaving a voicemail message, by e-mailing IRBPHS@usfca.edu, or by writing to the IRBPHS, Department of 
Psychology, University of San Francisco, 2130 Fulton Street, San Francisco, CA 94117-1080. 
 
Consent-I have been given a copy of the "Research Subject's Bill of Rights" and I have been given a copy of this 
consent form to keep. PARTICIPATION IN RESEARCH IS VOLUNTARY. I am free to decline to be in this 
study, or to withdraw from it at any point. My decision as to whether or not to participate in this study will have 
no influence on my present or future status as a student or employee at USF. 
 
My signature below indicates that I agree to participate in this study. 
  
                 
Subject's Signature                                                                         Date of Signature 
 
 
                 




INFORMED CONSENT FORM  
Activities and Survey- For Our Records 
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO 
CONSENT TO BE A RESEARCH SUBJECT 
Purpose and Background – We are working with researchers in the School of Economics at the University of 
San Francisco and we are doing a study on microfinance borrowers. Our purpose is to contribute to the limited 
data on Microfinance in Jordan in order to increase the level of understanding of the impact of Microfinance 
Institutions in the Middle East.  
  
You, the participant, are being asked to participate because you are an eligible borrower of the National 
Microfinance Bank (Alwatani). 
 
Procedures - If you agree to be a participant in this study, the following will happen: 
1. You will complete a survey giving basic information regarding yourself and your family, personal 
characteristics, household financial information, risk and time preferences, decision making behavior and 
religious affiliation. 
2. You will complete two activities. 
 
Risks and/or Discomforts - 
1. It is possible that some of the questions within the survey may make you feel uncomfortable, but you are 
free to decline to answer any questions you do not wish to answer or to stop participation at any time.  
2. Participation in research may mean a loss of confidentiality. Study records will be kept as confidential as is 
possible. No individual identities will be used in any reports or publications resulting from the study. 
Study information will be coded and kept in locked files at all times. Only study personnel will have 
access to the files.  
3. Because the time required for your participation may be up to 45 minutes, you may become tired or bored. 
 
Benefits- There will be no direct benefit to me from participating in this study. The anticipated benefit of this 
study is a better understanding of microfinance borrowers. 
 
Costs/Financial Considerations-There will be no financial costs to me as a result of taking part in this study. 
 
Questions- You, the participant, have spoke to me, the enumerator, about this study and have had your questions 
answered. If you have further questions about the study, you may call Dunia Aburish at 0799468974 or e-mail her 
at dsaburish@dons.usfca.edu. If you have any questions or comments about participation in this study, you should 
first talk to Ms. Aburish. If for some reason you do not wish to do this, you may contact the IRBPHS, which is 
concerned with protection of volunteers in research projects. You, the participant, may reach the IRBPHS office by 
calling +1 (415) 422-6091 and leaving a voicemail message, by e-mailing IRBPHS@usfca.edu, or by writing to the 
IRBPHS, Department of Psychology, University of San Francisco, 2130 Fulton Street, San Francisco, CA 94117-
1080. 
 
Consent- You have been read a copy of the "Research Subject's Bill of Rights" and you have been given a copy of 
this consent form to keep. PARTICIPATION IN RESEARCH IS VOLUNTARY. You are free to decline to be in 
this study, or to withdraw from it at any point. Remember that your decision as to whether or not participate in 
this study will have no influence on your present or future status as an eligible borrower of NMB. 
 
The participant's signature below indicates that he/she agrees to participate in this study. 
  
                 
Subject's Signature                                                                         Date of Signature 
 
 
                 





I will begin by asking you some basic information about yourself. Then, I will ask you about other people who live in the same house as 
you. Remember to answer as honestly and accurately as you can. If participant  asks you to skip a question, write in z for the answer. Otherwise, write in the corresponding 
letter to their answer. 
# QUESTION TO BE READ LIST OF ANSWERS TO BE READ RESPONSE  SKIP 
DIRECTIONS 
   (Male/ Female)  
1.  When is your birthday? (DAY/MONTH/YEAR) 
 
  
2.  And what is the highest level of 
education that you have? Is it... 
A -No Formal Education 
B - Primary school 
C - Secondary School 
D - High School 
E – Higher Education 
      Specify: 
  
3.   And what is your main 
occupation? Is it… 
 
 A. Your Project 
B. Employed, (basic salary) outside of the project 
C. Employed, (side jobs) outside of project 
D. Employed, (domestic/household jobs outside of 
your house) 
E. Unemployed  
  
4.  And what is the religion that 
you identify with most? Is it... 
A - Islam 
B - Christianity 
C - Or other 
  
5.  And what is the relationship to 
you of the main income earner in 
your household? Is it your... 
A - (Husband/Wife) 
B – You 
C - One of your parents 
D - One of your spouse's parents 
E - One of your children 
F - Or someone I have not named 
  
6.  And are you... A - Never Married 
B - Married 
C - Widowed 
D - Separated 
E - Or Divorced 
 IF B, 
continue, 






7.  Since you are married, I would (Write in birthdate   )   
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like some basic information on 
your husband/wife. What is the 
birthdate of your spouse? 
 
8.  And what is the highest level of 
education of your husband/wife? 
A - No Formal Education 
B - Primary school 
C - Secondary School 
D - High School 
E - College 
F - Or a Graduate Degree 
  
9.  Is your spouse... A - Unemployed 
B - Employed (basic salary) ), from your project 
C - Employed (basic salary), NOT from your project  
D - Side Jobs (random income) 
  
10.  Does your spouse currently have 
any loans out him/her self? 
A - Yes  
B - or No 
  
11.  Do you have any children of 
your own? 
A. Yes or 
B. No 
 
If B, skip 
to question 
20 
12.  Have you enrolled your children 
in private school in the last ten 
years? If so, when? 




13.  What amount of the household 
income is spent on each child’s 
education per month, such as the 
tuition, books, pens and papers, 
uniforms, and tutors? 
Specify amount:   
14.  How much of your loan is used 
for this expense?  
Specify amount of loan   
15.  On average, each year, how 
many times do your children go 
to see a doctor for checkups? 
Specify amount:   
16.  What amount of the household 
income is spent on child 
healthcare per month, this 
includes doctor visits, and 
immunizations? 
Specify amount   
17.  What part of that expenditure is 
from loans? 




What amount of the household 
income is spent on maternal 
health, pre and post birth? 
Specify amount:   
 
19.  
What part of that expenditure 
is/was from the loan? 
Specify amount:   
20.  Can you tell me the relationship, 
age, occupation, and education 




Age Occupation Education level 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
 
Thank you for the information on your household. Now I am going to ask you questions about what you like and do not like. First I will 
ask you a question and then give you options to choose from. Please pick the option you agree with the most and answer as accurately and 
honestly as possible.  IF INFORMANT ASKS YOU TO SKIP A QUESTION, WRITE IN "Z" FOR THE ANSWER. OTHERWISE, WRITE IN THE CORRESPONDING LETTER TO THEIR 
ANSWER. Here is the first question: 
21.  If you have an unpleasant task, would you be 
more likely to… 
A - Do it today   or     
B - Put it off until later   
  
22.  Which of the following applies to you more… A - You can never be too careful with money or 
B - You need to take risks to make money    
  
23.  If someone were to give you a gift, would you 
be more likely to prefer… 
A - A modest gift today  or     
B - An extravagant gift in the future 
  
24.  Do you admire people who… A - Take risks  or     
B - Take precautions 
  
25.  If you have to pay a bill at the end of the 
month and you have money now to pay for it, 
would you be more likely to… 
A - Pay it at the end of the month    or     




26.  To have a successful business, it is more 
important to… 
A - Continue with what has been proven to work    or     
B - Try new but unproven ideas 
  
27.  If you have 2 Kanafa, would you be more 
likely to… 
A - Eat them all today    or     
B - Eat one today and save the rest for later 
  
28.  If you take a risk and you are successful, 
would you be more likely to…  
A - Take the same risk next time    or     
B - Take caution next time 
  
29.  If you receive 50 dinars today, would you be 
more likely to… 
A - Save it for a special occasion    or     
B - Spend it today 
  
30.  Do you often… A - Stick with what you know    or     
B - Try new things 
  
31.  If you had an important chore to do by the 
end of the week, would you 
A - Do it today because you know it is not likely that 
you will complete it later    or     
B - Do it later because you want to enjoy today and you 
know you will get it done before the end of the week 
  
32.  If your friend owned a successful sewing 
business, would you think that it is a good 
idea to start your own sewing business based 
off of your friend's success? 
A - No   or   
B - Yes 
  
33.  Would you say that it is better to… 
 
A - Earn 400 JD while taking classes that will help you 
earn 1000 JD per month in two years or     
B - Work and earn 600 JD per month 
  
34.  Is it more important to be… 
 
A - Cautious   or     
B – Bold 
  
35.  Do you… A - Eat some foods that are delicious even though they 
may be unhealthy   or     
B - Always try to eat food that is good for you 
  
36.  When your friend is making important 
decisions for his or her business, is it better 
for him or her to… 
A - Take risks  or     
B - Take precautions 
  
37.  Overall, how patient would you say you are? A - Patient or      
B – Not patient at all    
  
38.  If you are in a moving car, do you feel… A - It is necessary to wear your seatbelt   or     
B - It is not necessary to wear your seatbelt 
  
39.  Generally speaking, would you say that most 
people you meet for the first time can be 
trusted or that you need to be very careful in 
dealing with people that you meet for the first 
time? 
A - Most people can be trusted   
  or     




40.  Do you think most people would try to take 
advantage of you if they got a chance, or 
would they try to be fair? 
A - Would take advantage of you    or     
B - Would try to be fair 
  
41.  Would you say that most of the time people 
try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just 
looking out for themselves? 
A - Try to be helpful    or     
B - Just look out for themselves 
  
Ok Great. Now I will switch the focus of my questions to ask you about your business. Please answer questions as accurately and 
honestly as you can. IF INFORMANT ASKS YOU TO SKIP A QUESTION, WRITE IN Z FOR THE ANSWER. OTHERWISE, WRITE IN THE CORRESPONDING LETTER TO THEIR 
ANSWER. Here is the first question: 
42.  What is your project? A - Sewing Business 
B - Retail Business 
C - Food/Supermarket Services 
D - Decoration/Flower Services 
E - Transportation Services 
F - Other Services 
  
43.  And is this project your household's main 
source of income? 
A - No 
B – Yes 
  
44.  Do you own this project/business with 
anyone? 
A - Yes, my husband and I own this jointly 
B - Yes, my children and I own this jointly 
C- Yes, my parents and I own this jointly 
D - No, I alone own this business 
  
45.  Who of the following helped you start up 
this project?  
A - My husband and I started this project  
B - My children and I started this project 
C- My parents and I started this project 
D - I alone started this business 
  
46.  Other than yourself, how many employees 
do you manage in this project/business? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15+   
47.  On average, how much monthly revenue 
does this project/business provide your 
household? 
   
48.  On average, how much does this 
project/business cost your household  to run 
each month? (including electricity, rent, 
water, transportation to run the business) 
   
49.  And how much money do you have in 
savings which is money that you are not 
spending? 
A – 0-250 JD 
B – 251-500 JD 
C – 501-1000 JD 




Ok, now I will be asking you about specific investments you have made in your business, and with your home. Remember that your 
information is kept secret and no one will know that you specifically have answered any question in any way. Thus, please answer 
questions as accurately and honestly as you can. IF INFORMANT ASKS YOU TO SKIP A QUESTION, WRITE IN Z FOR THE ANSWER. OTHERWISE, WRITE IN THE 
CORRESPONDING LETTER TO THEIR ANSWER. Here is the next question then: 
50.  Has any family member in the household 
been married in the last ten years? If so, 
when?  





51.  Has anyone in the household had a child in 
the last ten years? If so, when? 





52.  Would you prefer to send your children to 
regular schools or Islamic schools? 
A – Regular schools 
B – Islamic schools 
  
53.  Has anyone in the household been 
hospitalized for more than one week in the 
last ten years? If so, when? 





54.  If you have a loan with Alwatani, when was 




55.  Why did you decide to take out your very 
first microfinance loan? Please tell me all 
options that are true... 
A - To start or invest in a project 
B - To contribute income to my family 
C -To give the money to my husband 
D - To give the money to a friend/neighbor 
  
56.  Who in your household made the decision for 
you to take out your very first microfinance 
loan? 
A - I alone made this decision 
B - My husband and I made the decision equally 
C - My husband alone made this decision 
D - Someone else made this decisoin (Specify) 
  
57.  And at the time when you took out your first 
loan, which would you agree with most: 
A-You and your husband were equal partners in your 
household 
B- For most things, your husband has the final word. 
C-For most things, you have the final word. 
  
58.  Have you borrowed from any MFI’s other 
than Alwatani in the last ten years? If so, 
when? 









60.      
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What is the amount of the current loan? Specify amount: 
 
61.  Why did you take out this current loan? 
Please tell me all options that are true... 
A - To start or invest in a project 
B - To help during a temporary emergency 
C - The loan was for someone else 
D - The loan was for my husband/wife 
  
62.  Who in your household made the decision for 
you to take out this current loan? 
A - I alone made this decision 
B - I made this decision with my family 
C - I made this decision with my husband 
D - My husband made this decision 
E - Someone else made this decision (Specify) 
_______________________________________ 
  
63.  Have you made the following investment?   New machinery: sewing machines, cash 
registers, shampoo bed, and other significant 
investments, but not simple tools 
 If so, how much of your loan did you use? 
o Specify investment: 
 
o Specify year: 




64.  Have you done the following  New store: new store, new room in the house 
for selling, a new selling space in the market, or 
significant expansion to current store. 
 If so, how much of your loan did you use? 
o Specify investment: 
 
 
o Specify year: 
 
 
o Specify amount of loan 
 
  
65.  Have you  Increased inventory: significant increased in 
inventory such as new type of goods sold in the 
store. 
 If so, how much of your loan did you use? 
o Specify investment: 
 
 
o Specify year: 
 





66.  Have you bought  New livestock: major livestock purchase 
 If so, how much of your loan did you use? 
o Specify investment: 
 
 
o Specify year: 
 
 
o Specify amount of loan: 
 
  
67.  Have you hired  New employee: a permanent employee with a  
regular wage 
 If so, how much of your loan did you use? 
o Specify amount of employees: 
 
o Specify year: 
 
 
o Specify amount of loan: 
 
  
68.  In the last ten years, have you invested in any 
of these home improvement projects?  
Check the ones that apply 
 1 2 3 4 
Increasing 
the # of 
bedrooms 
1-2 3-4 5 6+ 
Upgrading 
Walls 












Turkish   
Other 
(specify) 
    
 
 
69.  When did the home improvement project 
take place? 
Specify year:   
70.  Did you use your loans on the project? If so, 
how much? 
A. No or 
B. Yes 
Specify amount of loan: 
  
71.  In the last ten years, have you purchased any Check the ones that apply   
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of these household durable goods?  New television 
 New refrigerator 
 New car 
 New stove 
 Air conditioning units/ Ceiling fans 
 Other (specify) 
 
72.  When did you make these purchases? Specify year:  
 
  
73.  Did you use your loans on the purchases? If 
so, how much? 
A. No or 
B. Yes  
Specify amount: 
  
74.  What type of drinking water do you 
commonly use? 
A. Rain water 
B. Tanker truck 
C. Tap water 
D. Bottled water 
E. Cooler water 
  
75.  Do you own a computer/laptop? A - No   or 
B – Yes 
  
76.  Do you have Internet in your home? A - No   or 
B – Yes 
  
77.  Do you read the newspaper most days of the 
week? 
A - No   or 
B – Yes 
  
78.  Do you listen to music? A - No  or                    
B – Yes 
  







80.  What types of books do you like? A - Fiction 
B - Education 
C - Religious 
D - Leisure 
E - Other  
  
81.  What is your favorite book? _________________________   
82.  I know the Qur’an is the holy book of 
Muslims. Do you read the Qur’an? 
A - No  or                    




83.  How often do you read the Qur’an? A - Daily                   
B - Bi-Weekly 
C – Weekly 
D – In Ramadan 
E – Other 
  
I will now ask you a list of questions about your lending experiences. Please answer as accurately and honestly as possible. IF INFORMANT 
ASKS YOU TO SKIP A QUESTION, WRITE IN Z FOR THE ANSWER. OTHERWISE, WRITE IN THE CORRESPONDING LETTER TO THEIR ANSWER. Here is the next question 
then: 
84.  I would also like to know what microfinance 
institutions provide services to people in 












85.  Can you tell me the services, in general that 
these MFIs offer? DO NOT READ THE CHOICES, 
JUST LIST WHAT THEY SAY! 
A - Loans for women 
B - Loans for starting a business/entrepreneurs 
C - Loans for education 
D - Loans for consumption 
E - Islamic Loans 
  
86.  How did you hear about Alwatani? (select 
all) 
 
A - Through your friends 
B - Your neighbors 
C - Your spouse's family 
D - Through your family 
E - From a loan officer 
F - Or some other way I have not listed 
 
  
87.  Why did you take out this current loan? 
Please tell me all options that are true... 
A - To start or invest in a project 
B - To help during a temporary emergency 
C - The loan was for someone else 
D - The loan was for my husband/wife 
  
88.  Who in your household made the decision 
for you to take out this current loan? 
A - I alone made this decision 
B - I made this decision with my family 




D - My husband made this decision 
E - Someone else made this decision (Specify) 
_______________________________________ 
89.   Since you currently have a loan with 
Alwatani, what do you use this loan for? 
 
A - To invest in my business 
B - To supplement income for consumption 
C - To pay off another loan 
D – To use for a friend or family member 
E - Other 
 
  
90.  Do you prefer Islamic or commercial 
finance? 
A – Islamic finance 
B – Commercial finance 
 
 
91.  How do you know that a type of financing is 
Islamic? 
Do you:  
A – Trust the loan agency’s guidelines  
B – Consult a sheikh 
C – Consult a family member 
D - Other 
  
92.  Do usually you seek advice or counsel with a 
sheikh or imam regarding problems? 
A - No  or                    
B – Yes 
  
93.  In your opinion, should loan agencies charge 
interest rates? 
A - No   
B - Yes   or 
C - I am not sure, it depends 
  
94.  Why do you think loan agencies (should/should 
not) charge interest rates?  
A - It is because it helps the loan agency   
B - It is because of what is written in the Qur'an 
C - It is because of what it does to the poor   
D - or Other 
  
Now, this section will present to you a scenario with several options for which you could respond to. Please tell me all that apply and 
answer as accurately and honestly as possible. . IF INFORMANT ASKS YOU TO SKIP A QUESTION, WRITE IN Z FOR THE ANSWER. OTHERWISE, WRITE IN THE 
CORRESPONDING LETTER TO THEIR ANSWER. Here is the next question then: 
95.  Let's say you are walking to the market by 
yourself to buy some tea. This would mean 
you have no male or female companion. Of 
the following options, please tell me all who 
would or would not be upset about this 
situation.  
A - Your neighbors would be upset you had no companion 
B - Your spouse's family would be upset  
C - Your family would be upset 
D - Your spouse would be upset  
E - You would be upset  
F - Or would no one be upset? 
  
96.  Let's say you are doing your regular daily or 
weekly shopping for food. Are you more 
likely to... 
 
A - Only buy what has been previously discussed with your 
husband    





97.  Now, let's say that you have decided to make 
a major purchase, such as a car. Who makes 
this decision in your household? Is it... 
A - Your husband  
B - Your husband's family  
C - Your family  
D - Yourself 
E - Your husband and you decide together 
  
98.  Now you have decided to make a small 
purchase, such as clothes, who makes this 
decision in your household? 
A - Your husband  
B - Your husband's family  
C - Your family  
D - Yourself 
E - Your husband and you decide together 
  
99.  And which do you agree with most: A-You and your husband are equal partners in your household 
B- For most things, your husband has the final word. 
C-For most things, you have the final word. 
  
Well, that was the last question I wanted to ask you. On behalf of our whole research team, we sincerely thank you for your participation 
in this study. Your responses should help us better understand how microfinance is changing people's lives. It can also help us to see 
where we can improve and what we are already doing well. Thank you, again and have a wonderful day! 
 
 
 
